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DIGITAL COLONIALISM: THE 21ST CENTURY
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA THROUGH THE
EXTRACTION AND CONTROL OF USER DATA AND
THE LIMITATIONS OF DATA PROTECTION LAWS
Danielle Coleman *
Abstract
As Western technology companies increasingly rely on user data globally,
extensive data protection laws and regulations emerged to ensure ethical use of that
data. These same protections, however, do not exist uniformly in the resource-rich,
infrastructure-poor African countries, where Western tech seeks to establish its
presence. These conditions provide an ideal landscape for digital colonialism.
Digital colonialism refers to a modern-day “Scramble for Africa” where largescale tech companies extract, analyze, and own user data for profit and market
influence with nominal benefit to the data source. Under the guise of altruism, large
scale tech companies can use their power and resources to access untapped data on the
continent. Scant data protection laws and infrastructure ownership by western tech
companies open the door for exploitation of data as a resource for profit and a
myriad of uses including predictive analytics.
One may believe that strengthening data protection laws will be a barrier to
digital colonialism. However, regardless of their relative strength or weakness, data
protection laws have limits. An analysis of Kenya's 2018 data protection bill, the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and documented actions of largescale tech companies exemplifies how those limits create several loopholes for
continued digital colonialism including, historical violations of data privacy laws;
limitations of sanctions; unchecked mass concentration of data, lack of competition
enforcement, uninformed consent, and limits to defined nation-state privacy laws.
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INTRODUCTION
To discuss the extraction, synthesis, and control of user data is to
discuss the pulse of commerce, the ever-looming power of large tech
companies, and the shift of human emotional interaction to everything in
our daily lives. However, to discuss the extraction, synthesis, and control
over user data and critical connectivity infrastructure by Western tech
companies in African countries with limited infrastructure, limited data
protection laws, and limited competition—combined with social, political and economic power imbalances and decades of resource pillaging—is
to discuss digital colonialism.
This Note argues that digital colonialism is part of the modern day
“Scramble for Africa” that takes place through the extraction and control
of user data by large scale tech companies. Part I will establish the background of colonization and the role of corporations so as to enable the
comparison between nineteenth century colonialism and twenty-first
century colonialism. Part II will explain the definition of digital colonialism, why data is a rich resource comparable to natural resources, and how
large tech companies exploit this resource for profit and for use in predictive analytics. Part III will explain the limits to the purported solution to
digital colonialism—data protection laws—using examples from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Kenya’s 2018 Data Protection Bill.
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I. Colonization and the Role of Corporations
In the nineteenth century, many African countries faced imperialist
aggression through military invasions, land conquests, economic exploitation, genocide, and violent resource extraction at the behest of European
world powers. This colonialist rise began after the end of the Transatlantic slave trade and was formalized at the Berlin Colonial Conference,
where soon to be colonial powers gathered to develop a plan that would
upset and disrupt the social, economic, and political landscape of Africa
forever.1 Between 1884 and 1885, under the guise of White supremacy,
deeply ingrained anti-Black sentiment, and unchecked power, European
powers carved up the continent in what has become known as the
“Scramble for Africa”—the creation of arbitrary lines equating to colonies, and the forced subjugation of African peoples. 2 At the end of the
conference, the powers present signed the General Act of the Conference
of Berlin, giving purported legal effect to their new territories under the
baseless premise that African nations had no sovereignty and no legal
claim over their state, land, or resources. 3 This, coupled with the beliefs
inherent within the White imagination that African peoples were “evolutionar[il]y backward and undeveloped” and that “[i]t was a European responsibility to act as trustees of Africa until Africans were mature enough
to govern themselves,”4 set the ideological tone for ruthless colonization.
European powers’ proliferation of claims in Africa were characteristically expeditious such that, by 1900, European states including Great
Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain had
claimed nearly 90 percent of African territory.5 Due to the rise of industrial capitalism, there was a staunch belief that the economic, and thus
political, future of an industrial country hinged on exclusive control of its
markets and raw materials. 6 Therefore, colonial powers stole from the

1. Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou, The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for
Africa, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1802, 1807 (2016).
2. See id. at 1802.
3. Matthew Craven, Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and
the Logic of Free Trade, 3 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 31, 32 (2015).
4. Jennifer Tanabe, Scramble for Africa, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 11, 2015),
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Scramble_for_Africa&oldid=
988092.
5. BERLIN CONFERENCE OF 1884–1885, OXFORD REFERENCE (2010),
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref9780195337709-e-0467.
6. A. ADU BOAHEN, AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON COLONIALISM 32 (1987).
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lands of Africa, violently extracting raw materials such as copper, cotton,
7
rubber, tea, gold, diamonds, and tin.
At the center of this pillaging was a simple colonialist economic
agenda, to provide maximum economic benefit at a minimal price. 8 Accordingly, investing in industrialization, improving the production processes, or strengthening the overall economy of the colonies was not a
9
priority. Oftentimes, the colonial powers refused to process the raw materials in-country, sending the raw materials to Europe to be processed,
obliterating the role of Africans in the export business and robbing them
of any economic profit and potential resource flow that could have derived from processing raw materials in country. 10 Although some colonial
powers did invest in transportation infrastructure such as railways, such
investments were strictly for the benefit of facilitating the efficient
transport of raw materials and not for the enrichment of the countries
themselves. 11 Simply put, “the infrastructure that was developed was designed to exploit the natural resources of the colonies.” 12
Corporations, aiding in this colonialist economic agenda, also
played a dominant role in colonial expansion. As early as the seventeenth
century, dozens of companies were granted trading monopolies by their
respective governments throughout the world. 13 Their monopoly over
trade in specified territories allowed these corporations the power to safeguard this monopoly and the power to exert rights over their country14
men who lived and worked within the territory. The granting of monopoly status by colonialist governments made these highly risky ventures
safer for investors with profit as the primary motive. 15 Investing in trading
companies emerged as one of the earliest forms of venture capital as,
“money could be raised in return for shares, profits could be divided
among shareholders, and shares could be transferred among members and
16
outsiders.”

7. See Felix K. Ekechi, The Consolidation of European Rule, 1885-194, in COLONIAL
AFRICA, 1885–1939, at 27, 36 (Toyin Falola ed., 2002); Julius O. Adekunle, West Africa,
in COLONIAL AFRICA, 1885–1939, at 377, 384 (Toyin Falola ed., 2002)
8. Joshua Dwayne Settles, The Impact of Colonialism on African Economic Development 8 (May 1, 1996) (unpublished thesis, University of Tennessee Honors Program)
(on file with University of Tennessee, Knoxville).
9. Id. at 7.
10. BOAHEN, supra note 7, at 61-62.
11. Settles, supra note 9, at 10.
12. Id.
13. Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 IND.
L.J. 363, 365 (2003).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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After a brief hiatus, the nineteenth century saw the resurgence of
trading companies as weapons wielded for colonial expansion and as additional revenue streams for the emerging economic system of industrial
capitalism. 17 By then, the experience of companies from the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries such as the British East India Company had
helped establish the corporate form as a dominant force for settlement
18
and colonization. This second wave of colonization by trading companies proved to be robust, as “more than 75 percent of British acquisitions
south of the Sahara were acquired by chartered companies”—not by equitable trading practices, but by monopolized consent, violence, and a
virtual absence of competition in extracting raw materials and resources.19
The four major trading companies of the nineteenth century consisted of the British South African Company, the Germany East African
Company, the Imperial British East African Company, and the Royal
Niger Company. 20 Over the span of decades, trading companies expanded indirect colonial rule through possessing new “protectorates or spheres
21
of influence”, exploited local faction rivalries, arming them in exchange
for better trading deals, 22 and established para military forces to facilitate
trading goals and increase profit, 23 laying the foundation for the eventual
mass exploitation of mineral resources and agricultural opportunities
across Africa including Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Central Africa, and
East Africa. 24 The control of territories by companies established for the
“explicit purpose of making money, meant, inevitably, that the territories
were administered simply for profit,” and that the companies took no in-

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 368.
Id. at 370.
McLean, supra note 14, at 370.
EUGENE STALEY, Modern Chartered Companies, in WAR AND THE PRIVATE
INVESTOR (1937), https://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/investor/Staley11.html.
th
st
21. William Reno, Order and commerce in turbulent areas: 19 century lessons, 21 century
practice, 25 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 607, 613 (2006), https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/01436590410001678889
22. Id. at 611.
23. STALEY, supra note 20. (“In connection with the colonial expansion of Europe in
the late nineteenth century, there appeared a brief revival of the type of organization
known as the chartered company. The hallmark of these—- called privileged companies
or sovereign companies—-was their possession of authority to govern as well as to carry
on commerce in territory placed under their jurisdiction. They were empowered to establish forts and police systems, to lay out roads, encourage colonization, levy duties and
taxes.”); See also British South Africa Company, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2018),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/British-South-Africa-Company.
24. BOAHEN, supra note 7, at 61-62.
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terest in developing local industrialization outside of its benefits for ad25
ministering the movement of natural resources and raw materials.
Although these companies were principally chartered to facilitate
“trade,” they were also legal extensions of the crown, a fact that afforded
them the right to assert sovereign powers over the non-European peoples
26
within the colony—a power they frequently exerted. Trading companies gradually became more intrusive in the governance of the colonies
27
to further their economic interests and those of the colonial powers. As
the intrusion grew, more demands were made on non-European states,
through threat of military action, to concede to the interests of the trading companies. 28 Eventually, chartered companies, as extensions of the
crown, were an authoritative force in territories, playing an imperative
role in territorial annexations and profiting from raw materials and valuable minerals—their primary reason for existing.29
Steeped in desperation to serve the industrial capitalist structure
built upon the backs of African people and lands—the foundation for
neo-mercantilism—colonial powers violently took over nations and exploited resource-rich African lands for their own economic benefit and
global economic prowess, both directly and via chartered companies.
II. Digital Colonialism
A. Defining Digital Colonialism
Earlier colonialists arrived on African shores to expand their empires
by exploiting local labor to extract valuable natural resources and raw
materials, building critical infrastructure like railroads in the process to
facilitate the import and export of these often dispossessed goods. 30 Today’s colonialists, however, are digital. They build communication infrastructures such as social media platforms and network connectivity for the
express purpose of harvesting data, churning a profit, and/or storing the
data as raw material for predictive analytics. 31
“Digital colonialism” is the decentralized extraction and control of
data from citizens with or without their explicit consent “through com25. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2007).
26. Id. at 68-69.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 68, 72.
29. STALEY, supra note 20.
30. See generally Michael Kwet, Digital Colonialism: US Empire and the New Imperialism
in the Global South 60 RACE & CLASS 3 (2019).
31. Id.
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munication networks developed and owned by Western tech compa32
nies.” As professors Hendricks, Marker, and Vestergaard from the University of Copenhagen posit, this structure has four fundamental actors:
(1)

The Western tech companies who create and provide
the technology and infrastructure that harvest the data
33
for ad targeting and ad distribution;

(2)

The advertising and consulting firms who use the technology provided by (1) to target various groups with
highly personalized ads and messages aimed at increasing
profits; 34

(3)

The “local companies, parties, and organizations who
pay (2) to help them impose their different agendas for
the respective countries”; 35 and

(4)

The citizens who knowingly and unknowingly act as data sources for (1) and as target groups for (2) and (3). 36

Scholar Michael Kwet further explains:
Under digital colonialism, foreign powers, led by the United
States, are planting infrastructure in the Global South engineered for its own needs, enabling economic and culture
domination while imposing privatized forms of governance.
To accomplish this task, major corporations design digital
technology to ensure their own dominance over critical functions in the tech ecosystem. This allows them to accumulate
profits from revenues derived from rent (in the form of intellectual property or access to infrastructure) and surveillance (in
the form of Big Data). It also empowers them to exercise control over the flow of information (such as the distribution of
news and streaming services), social activities (like social networking and cultural exchange) and a plethora of other politi-

32. Silas L. Marker, Mads Verstergaard & Vincent F. Hendricks, Digital Colonialism on
the African Continent, 10 AFR. STAT. NEWSL. 6, 6 (Jan. 2019), https://www.uneca.org/
sites/default/files/PageAttachments/asn_jan_2019_v_10_no1_v1_.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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cal, social and economic and military functions mediated by
37
their technologies.
Laying critical connectivity infrastructure owned by Western tech
companies, to extract and control untapped user data, however, is the
vanguard for this cultural and economic dominance. The extraction,
analysis, and control of data in African countries with limited infrastructure, limited data protection laws, and limited competition, combined
with social, political, and economic power imbalances and decades of resource pillaging is what gives the above consequences true power.
B. Data as a Resource
According to the Oxford New English Dictionary, currency is defined as a system of assets, property, and resources owned by someone or
38
something in general use in a particular country. Data is the new currency, and access to data—rather than money, natural resources, or advanced weaponry—is now the most valuable asset available to nation39
states and corporations. This development lays the foundation for large
Western tech companies’ movement into African markets.
Data is collected by corporations of all sizes through online behavioral tracking technology which “refers to the practice of tracking web
users (and mobile apps users) on the Internet . . . .” 40 This technology
records a large variety of data including, but not limited to, ad clicks, device specific information, face scan, ISP, ad name, phone numbers, search
queries, time, date, browser history, email addresses, IP addresses, location, operating system, and profile information. 41 The method of tracking
this data includes, but is not limited to, cookies, doubleclick and Adsense,
profile information, device tracking technology, facial recognition software, and search queries. 42 Collectively, this data creates an “anonymous”
digital profile of millions of users that is ultimately used to integrate multiple accounts to produce personalized content for location services and
37. Kwet, supra note 28, at 7-8.
38. Currency, ENGLISH OXFORD DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/currency (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
39. Data is the New Currency of Geopolitics, CIPHER BRIEF (Sept. 16, 2018),
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/data-is-the-new-currency-ofgeopolitics.
40. Ankur Arora & Monika Arora, Digital-Information Tracking Framework Using Blockchain, 7 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. SYS. 1, 1 (2018).
41. Mark van Rijmenam, What Data Do The Five Largest Tech Companies Collect - Infographic, DATAFLOQ (July 15, 2018), https://datafloq.com/read/what-data-do-the-fivelargest-tech-companies-colle/427.
42. Id.
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notification, and, most importantly, to be sold to data brokers, used as a
means for selling access to users for targeted advertising by third party
corporations, or collected and stored for future predictive analytic use.43
With over 1.25 billion people living in Africa, 44 this market represents a
treasure trove of data, much of which is as yet untapped by Western tech
45
companies.
Due to this robust and efficient online behavioral tracking technology, consumerism has now shifted from a story of mass consumption to a
“story of one.” 46 Because of the rapid development of portable technological devices like iPhones, smart watches and tablets, coupled with the
constant and ever-increasing use of social media across generations,47 the
potential for consumer engagement can now operate twenty-four hours a
day, making the transition from mass advertising to targeted advertising a
lucrative pursuit. Now, advertisers no longer must make assumptions
about consumers’ behavior 48 and can instead target consumers with extreme precision based on hyper-personalized data. 49
This helps corporations attract new business and “maximize engagement among target audiences,” resulting in a higher return on investment, 50 and creating a more efficient and cost-effective process for

43. Suneel Grover, Big Digital Data, Analytic Visualization, and the Opportunity of Digital
Intelligence, SAS INSTITUTE INC. (2014), https://support.sas.com/resources/papers/
proceedings14/SAS171-2014.pdf; Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here are the data
brokers quietly buying and selling your personal information, FAST COMPANY (2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buyingand-selling-your-personal-information.
44. Benjamin Elisha Sawe, How Many People Live In Africa?, WORLD ATLAS (2018),
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/how-many-people-live-in-africa.html.
45. Acha Leke & Landry Signé, Africa’s Untapped Business Potential: Countries, sectors,
and strategies, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BLS18234_
BRO_book_006.1_CH5.pdf (last visited July 5, 2019).
46. Michelle Evans, Why Data Is The Most Important Currency Used In Commerce Today,
FORBES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michelleevans1/2018/03/12/
why-data-is-the-most-important-currency-used-in-commerce-today/#be5259854eb3.
47. Percentage of U.S. population with a Social Media Profile from 2008 to 2019, STATISTA
(2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-with-asocial-network-profile/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
48. Rebecca Walker Reczek, Christopher Summers & Robert Smith, Targeted Ads
Don’t Just Make You More Likely to Buy - They Can Change How You Think About Yourself,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/targeted-ads-dont-just-makeyou-more-likely-to-buy-they-can-change-how-you-think-about-yourself.
49. Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Are More Complex Than It Lets On, WIRED
(May 25, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-targeted-ads-are-morecomplex-than-it-lets-on/.
50. Chris Dobson, Targeted Advertising Requires Good Data, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/04/05/targeted-advertisingrequires-good-data/#4a1537fd29db.

426

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 24:417

promotion, price point decision making, and distribution of products
51
and/or services. Within the modern capitalist society, this is the most
valuable information any company can possess.
However, the value of this data is based on the ability to “make
sense of the avalanche of data,” 52 and companies like Alphabet and Facebook have a leading edge due to their size, access to data, resources, and
53
data science infrastructure. For less robust companies and marketers,
54
harnessing data effectively can be challenging, as “the abundance of data
produced by disparate sources has made the task of identifying and unifying relevant insight seem colossal.”55 The inherent technical challenges in
turning large stores of data into valuable currency means that behemoths
like Alphabet and Facebook are well-positioned to dominate new large
markets with their highly-equipped platforms and resources by synthesizing the data into usable information, effectively controlling the market.
Artificial intelligence, specifically machine learning and natural language processing, gives companies the capability to better synthesize bil56
lions of data points and make inferences about users. This data can be
used to infer personal information such as a person’s background, religion
and beliefs, political views, sexual orientation and gender identity, social
connections, health, ethnicity, income levels, educational attainment,
marital status, family composition, financial stability, and creditworthiness, all without the user directly giving this information. 57 “The result is
the creation and amalgamation of digital footprints that provide in-depth
knowledge about [one’s] life.” 58 This data is eventually synthesized, used,
and sold for immense profit. 59
What is more alarming is that a handful of tech companies, like Alphabet and Facebook, are able to use artificial intelligence for predictive
analytics, which is “the use of data, statistical algorithms and machine
learning techniques to identify the likelihood of future outcomes based

51. Susan Ward, Use Target Marketing & Market Segmentation to Improve Your Bottom
Line, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/targetmarketing-2948355.
52. Evans, supra note 43.
53. Id.
54. Dobson, supra note 47.
55. Id.
56. Vivian Ng & Catherine Kent, Smartphone Data Tracking Is More Than Creepy –
Here’s Why You Should Be Worried, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://theconversation.com/smartphone-data-tracking-is-more-than-creepy-heres-whyyou-should-be-worried-91110.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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60

on historical data.” The goal is to go beyond knowing what is happening and what has happened to provide a best assessment of how users will
behave in the future. 61 Although predictive analytics can have positive effects in many sectors, such as the healthcare industry, they can also distort
the lines of privacy when dealing with individualized human behavior,
particularly when only a handful of companies have this information.
These possible intrusions into basic concepts of privacy can be seen
in Facebook’s uncanny ability to predict when a person is motivated to
do something, 62 when a person is feeling a range of emotions, such as
feeling down, 63 and when a couple’s relationship will end 64—all before
the users even know it themselves. Predictive analytics allows a handful
of companies to understand even the innermost emotions, and to predict
how this will affect future behavior. This information is extremely useful
to millions of corporations across the globe. It can affect the global economy, workforce development, small and large scale investments, resource
allocation, advertising, presidential elections, and every single segment of
global capitalism.
Furthermore, since machines are not humans and cannot “think,”
artificial intelligence needs gargantuan sets of data to “learn” from and
derive its predictive accuracy—to which only a handful of corporations
have access. Facebook itself has access to over two billion people’s sensitive information, including what they “like” and “dislike,” who their
friends are, to whom they talk the most, and where they physically travel 65—a level of intimate personal data that no other company in the
world has. Google dominates search engines with the ability to collect
data on over 1.17 billion global users. 66 Companies like Facebook and
Google then use these highly personal inferences and sensitive data as a
means of selling access to individuals to third-party corporations67—

60. Predictive Analytics: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/
en_us/insights/analytics/predictive-analytics.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2018).
61. Id.
62. Matsakis, supra note 46.
63. Id.
64. Alexis Kleinman, Facebook Can Predict With Scary Accuracy If Your Relationship
Will Last, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/14/
facebook-relationship-study_n_4784291.html.
65. Kwet, supra note 28, at 11.
66. Felix Richter, 1.17 Billion People Use Google Search, STATISTA (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://www.statista.com/chart/899/unique-users-of-search-engines-in-december2012/.
67. Kurt Wagner, This Is How Facebook Uses Your Data for Ad Targeting, RECODE (Apr.
11, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/4/11/17177842/facebook-advertising-adsexplained-mark-zuckerberg.
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68

making 40 billion dollars in 2017 alone. Additionally, when only a select few companies have access to the largest sets of valuable data, they
have a supreme advantage over competitors, ultimately controlling that
market and deciding who gets access, both presently and in the future,
while making the most profit. 69
For tech companies, the treasure trove of citizens’ data that lies in
Africa is a natural resource. The data may be extracted and sold as a
commodity to corporations and political interests who base their revenue
model on knowing their target groups so that they are able to push political messages and agendas or sell targeted products to citizens, thereby increasing their bottom-line. 70 The essence of this business model is already
established in the West. Tech companies “provide seemingly free communication services and search engines” and track users across platforms,
apps and the internet, all to enable advertisers to target consumers and
voters with hyper-personalized ads based on behavioral patterns, making
an enormous profit. However, when this business strategy is pursued in
countries with limited infrastructure, limited data protection laws, and
limited competition—while rooted in neoliberal notions of human
rights—it transitions from a business model into a form of digital colonialism.
Facebook’s Free Basics and Project Aires, and Google’s Project
Csquared and Project Loon, are just a few projects deployed by Western
71
tech companies in Africa as they expand their global reach for profit.
Much like the colonialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who
built critical infrastructure like railroads for the sole purpose of continuing to economically exploit the natural resources of Africa, giant tech
companies like Facebook and Alphabet are building network connectivity infrastructure for the benefit of profiting from the use of their online

68. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017
Results (Jan. 31, 2018), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/
2018/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2017-Results/default.aspx.
69. Kwet, supra note 28, at 11.
70. Marker et al., supra note 30, at 6.
71. Paul Sawers, Google and Partners Commit $100 Million to African Broadband Project
CSquared, VENTUREBEAT (May 16, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/05/16/
google-and-partners-commit-100-million-to-african-broadband-project-csquared/; Tom
Simonite, Project Loon, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar./Apr. 2015), https://www.technology
review.com/s/534986/project-loon/; Njeri Wangari Wanjohi & Kofi Yeboah, Free
Basics: Facebook’s Failure at ‘Digital Equality’, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/free-basics-facebook-failuredigital-equality-170828083453067.html; Frederic Lardinois, Facebook’s Terragraph and
ARIES Antennas Bring Internet to Underserved Areas, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/13/terragraph/.
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services, rather than building local infrastructure for sustained economic
development in African countries.
In 2017, Google and its partners committed $100 million to
Csquared, a broadband project in Africa aimed at providing high-speed,
affordable, and reliable connectivity infrastructure to further grow inter72
net access in Africa. This is a laudable goal; however, by “doubling
down on its efforts to support the underlying internet infrastructure,
which, in turn, opens up new markets for the internet giant’s own online
services,” it increases their access to data. 73 In 2012, the idea for Project
Loon was born in order to get billions of people online where cell towers
do not exist via helium balloons. 74 This type of technological advancement could be revolutionary for rural communities and other places in
which millions of people are in desperate need for internet access yet
physical hardware connectivity is not always possible, particularly after
natural disasters. However, as scholar Tom Simonite in the MIT Technology Review notes:
It is odd for a large public company to build out infrastructure
aimed at helping the world’s poorest people. But in addition
to Google’s professed desires to help the world, the economics
of ad-supported Web businesses give the company other reasons to think big. It’s hard to find new customers in Internet
markets such as the United States. Getting billions more people online would provide a valuable new supply of eyeballs
and personal data for ad targeting. 75
Although software is not technically infrastructure, it is also central
to the overall development of technological connectivity being used to
harvest data for economic profit. Free Basics, Facebook’s mobile application, gives users in developing nations access to limited online services
and content for free. “Fundamentally, Free Basics is a data-lite mobile application that allows users to browse a narrowed down version of the internet” 76 as an “on ramp” to introduce internet to those who otherwise
would not have access. 77 By using neoliberal code words like “democra-

72. Sawers, supra note 69.
73. Id.
74. Simonite, supra note 69.
75. Id.
76. Kush Fanikiso, Free Basics and the Age of Digital Colonialism, MEDIUM
(Sept. 23, 2017), https://medium.com/@makushline/free-basics-and-the-age-of-digitalcolonialism-329e1041477e.
77. See Ellery Roberts Biddle, Opinion, The More We Connect, the Better It Gets - for
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/opinion/
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cy,” “equality,” and “internet as a basic human right,” Facebook masks
78
its true long-term goal of collecting data on “the next billion.” Free Ba79
sics harvests an enormous amount of metadata on users. When a user
clicks on a website in Free Basics, “that click sends packets of data to Facebook’s servers.” 80 Furthermore, “[s]ince all of the data exchanged on
Free Basics goes through Facebook’s Proxy servers, Facebook now has a
81
way to access users [sic] data outside of Facebook.” Research by Citizen
Media and activist group Global Voices found that the Free Basics program has enabled Facebook to gather data about the habits, interests, and
behaviors of users in the developing world, where Facebook aspires to
have a strong presence as more users come online. 82 In sum, “Free Basics
is a closed space where Facebook picks the content—and profits from users’ data along the way—creating what some people call a ‘poor internet
for poor people.’ ”83
Only 31 percent of people on the continent of Africa have access to
the internet, 84 making it clear that Africa faces connectivity, access, and
infrastructure issues. However, it is by no means certain that this is a
problem for foreign tech companies.85 Due to this lack of infrastructure
and connectivity, giant tech companies are acting as the “White savior,”
much like colonial powers who disguised the Scramble for Africa as liberalization intended to help the “noble savage.” These companies claim
that they want to bridge the digital divide and give internet access to the
millions of people who otherwise would not have it, but their true purpose is simply to extract data for profit and predictive analytics.
Furthermore, by capitalizing on “ ’first mover’ advantage” with an
army of lawyers and operating on such a massive scale, giant tech companies face extremely limited competition, both locally and internationally,
and can outcompete or simply buy up competitors around the world.86

78. Olivia Solon, ‘It’s Digital Colonialism’: How Facebook’s Free Internet Service Has Failed
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Much like chartered companies in the nineteenth century, who used limited trade competition to create monopolistic economic control within
the colonies, these giant tech companies can control how the connectivity infrastructure is built, what apps and services users have access to, and
what happens to the data due to the lack of competition. With Free Basics spanning sixty countries, reaching hundreds of millions of mobile
87
phone users in Africa alone, Facebook has the most data points about
new users from emerging markets, and the best resources to synthesize
this data into usable information—more than the majority of other companies in the market and most governments. 88 This makes Facebook the
centerpiece of control for extremely valuable data sets, at no benefit to
the users or the countries themselves.
III. Limitations of Data Protection Laws
Some scholars believe that the digital colonialism as described in
Part II, is enhanced by scant data protection laws in Africa that leave users
exposed. 89 However, the limits to data protection laws, which occur regardless of the relative strength or weakness of the laws, are overwhelming and fail to provide a panacea to digital colonialism. This Part describes these limitations and how they operate.
A. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and
Kenya’s Data Protection Laws
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force on May 25, 2018, is now the world’s strongest data protection
90
law. It applies to European companies broadly, as well as any company
across the globe that collects data on its citizens. Designed to modernize
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Leaves Internet Users Exposed, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/
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laws that protect sensitive and personal information of users, this law
“reshape[s] how technology companies store, process, and profit from users’ personal information.” 92 It also gives the user the “right to be forgotten,” as well as the right to withdraw their data from collection.93
GDPR has elevated the standard for data protection laws globally,
and yet in Africa, there is no continent-wide consensus of an approach to
personal data protection, as some countries have little to no data protection laws or constitutional protections, while others have robust data protection laws. 94 Based on 2017 data, there are seventeen countries in Africa
that have enacted comprehensive personal data protection legislation.
Three more countries, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, have enacted personal data protection legislation that is currently moving through the
lawmaking process. In addition, the African Union (AU) adopted the AU
Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection (AU Convention) in
June 2014, 95 which provides “a personal data protection framework
which African countries may potentially transpose into their national leg96
islation.” However, the AU Convention has only been ratified by four
of the fifty-four AU member jurisdictions and needs to be ratified by fifteen member jurisdictions in order to take effect. 97 Nevertheless, there
are common themes and principles between the GDPR and comprehensive data protection legislation adopted by some African countries.98
These themes comprise
x
x
x
x
x

notice;
choice and consent;
data security;
data access and correction;
data quality and integrity;

91. Id.
92. Abdi Latif Dahir, Africa Isn’t Ready to Protect Its Citizens Personal Data Even as EU
Champions Digital Privacy, QUARTZ: AFRICA (May 8, 2018), https://qz.com/africa/
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(2017),
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95. Cynthia Rich, Privacy Laws in Africa and the Near East, BNA 1 (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/170911-privacy-africa.pdf.
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36, June 27, 2014.
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data retention and destruction;
registration with a data protection authority (DPA);
cross-border data transfers;
personal data breach notification; and
appointment of a data protection officer (DPO).99

Many of these themes are incorporated in Kenya’s 2018 Data Pro100
tection Bill (DPB), which is said to mirror the GDPR. Once passed, it
will give Kenyan citizens a series of rights including: 1) the right to ask
companies to clearly explain, using accessible language, how their personal data is being collected, used, and stored; 2) the right to request that
their personal data be deleted; and 3) the right to object to their personal
101
data being used for specific purposes like targeted advertising. This will
also require companies to gain consent from users before collecting their
data. 102 The DPB is all-encompassing, applying to “all data subjects, regardless if they reside in Kenya, whose data is, or has been, collected or
processed by a data controller in Kenya.” 103 However, this bill has re104
ceived much scrutiny, and many provisions, much like some in the
GDPR, reflect the limits of data protection laws against digital colonialism.
Once enacted, the Bill will give effect to Article 31(c) and Article
31(d) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which guarantees every person
the right not to have “information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed,” and the right not to have “the
privacy of their communications infringed.” 105 This will directly tie this
law to the Constitution of Kenya, the supreme law of the land, which is
binding on all persons.
B. Violation of Data Privacy Laws
Unfortunately, big tech companies can violate (and have blatantly
violated) these laws, since they have the time, money, and resources to
fight for their desired outcomes, even if they stand in direct violation of
pre-established laws. For example, Uber has flaunted its willingness to
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100. Brian Obilo, Kenya Data Protection Bill 2018, INTERNET YETU (Aug. 25, 2018),
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operate in clear violation of local laws, launching in cities where its oper106
ation violates city ordinances. “The company’s non-compliance with
city ordinances ranges from Uber drivers not having the required driving
permits to refusing a request by California state regulators to provide information about their drivers.” 107 Uber’s violation of the law extends
globally—a French Court in 2016 convicted Uber of violating French
108
transport and privacy laws.
Additionally, Google Books made a clear and public move to violate copyright law. 109 The goal of Google Books was to scan millions of
books into digital format to add to their search engine, despite the project’s clear violation of age-old copyright laws. 110 At this legal battle’s inception, approximately 24 million titles were under copyright protection.
The potential cost for Google infringing on each work totaled 3.6 trillion, and yet Google forged ahead. 111 After a nearly decade-long legal battle, Google prevailed, and the courts upheld their fair-use claims. 112
These examples from the Global North indicate that the presence of
a comprehensive data protection legislation does not mean that large tech
companies will actually comply if the benefit of violation exceeds the
burden of consequence. This also proves the limits to penalties, fines, and
sanctions against large tech companies—digital colonialism’s most prominent purveyors.
C. Limitations of Penalties, Fines, and Sanctions
GDPR fines for offenses are the greater sum of up to 20 million euros or 4 percent of a firm’s global turnover. 113 However, if Google was
willing to risk paying 3.6 trillion for a clear violation of law, arguably it
would be willing to risk paying the GDPR penalty. That is, if the violation is worth it for the company, or if they have the resources to defend
the alleged violation in court, the company may go ahead with its ac106. Jordan Golson, Uber Used an Elaborate Secret Program to Hide from Government Regulators, THE VERGE (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/3/14807472/ubergreyball-regulators-taxi-legal-vtos.
107. Anjuan Simmons, Technology Colonialism, MODEL VIEW CULTURE (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://modelviewculture.com/pieces/technology-colonialism.
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Violating Transport, Privacy Laws, WALL STREET J. (June 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
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tions, even if it knows they are likely to be in violation. Kenya’s DBP on
the on the other hand, is silent on penalties or fines against corporations
found to be in violation of the data protection law, leaving it up to the
complaints commission to decide the course of action.114Although this is a
better proposition considering that the complaint commission may be
able to exercise more effective sanctions that would serve as greater deterrents for large tech companies than monetary fines, there is still a
loophole. Large tech companies and data brokers could simply dissolve
before they ever have to face any accountability measures. This is the
current predicament of Cambridge Analytica.
Cambridge Analytica, a data firm, harvested the personal data of approximately 50 million Americans and at least one million Brits through
115
Facebook. This data was ultimately used to influence the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election of Donald Trump, as demonstrated by Cambridge
Analytica’s CEO, who was caught via secret recording claiming direct
credit for the election of Donald Trump.116 Additionally, senior executives were “filmed describing its dominant role in Kenyan President
Uhuru Kenyatta’s election campaigns in 2013 and 2017 and were caught
boasting about psychological manipulation, entrapment techniques and
fake news campaigns.” 117 The Information Commissioner’s Office, a UK
independent authority, is prosecuting SCL Elections, Cambridge Analytica’s parent company, for failing to comply with an enforcement notice.118
However, SCL Elections filed bankruptcy in May and will be completely
dissolved by the January 2019 trial date. 119 The ICO is examining whether the SCL Elections directors can still be pursued; however, it seems that
this major data firm will escape unscathed despite their clear violation of
pre-GDPR protection laws. 120 All of this sets the foundation for the potential abuse of power by large tech companies who can blatantly violate
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laws and skirt fines, penalties and sanctions, leaving the local citizens
whom they exploit for data extraction powerless, despite clear data protection laws.
D. Mass Concentration of Data and Lack of Competition Enforcement
Another clear limit to data privacy laws is that the lack of protection
against the mass concentration of data by dominant players is compounded by the lack of competition enforcement measures. Competition, data
protection, and consumer protection law are inextricably related, and data privacy legislation often does not take this into account—Kenya’s
DPB included. Without these protections, enormous amounts of data
will be centrally held and owned by dominant players who have the resources to stomp out their competition, leaving the fate of millions and
sometimes billions of people’s personal and sensitive data in the hands of
a select few.
This was particularly visible in the merger decision for Facebook
and WhatsApp. Facebook already had a lion’s share of the data market,
with access to over 2 billion users’ data. The “main reason for Facebook’s
interest in WhatsApp is believed to lie in the troves of data that came
121
with the acquisition” —namely, 500 million users. This was also a strategic acquisition to help Facebook fuel growth in developing markets,
opening up data extraction opportunities for over 172 million WhatsApp
122
users in Africa. The lack of protection against mass concentration of data and the lack of regulation of anti-competitive conduct by companies
fuels the concentration of mass data, as there are no regulations within
data privacy law that apply when a company has either 1) simply amassed
too much data at the risk of users or 2) has amassed too much data at the
risk of users through means of acquisitions, decreasing market competition.
Additionally, this hole creates a high barrier of entry for small, medium, and local tech companies who simply cannot compete with global
tech companies. The cost for running centralized social networks is extremely expensive. A company must pay for costly cloud infrastructure,
find and pay skilled programmers, and be able to pay for quality data col-

121. Inge Graef, European Commission Approves Facebook/WhatsApp Deal: Data Concentration and Privacy as Competition Concerns?, MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/10/17/european-commission-approvesfacebookwhatsapp-deal-data-concentration-and-privacy-as-competition-concerns/.
122. Abdi Latif Dahir, Whatsapp is the Most Popular Messaging App in Africa,
QUARTZ (Feb. 14, 2018), https://qz.com/africa/1206935/whatsapp-is-the-mostpopular-messaging-app-in-africa/.

2019]

Digital Colonialism

437
123

lection and storage in a way that adheres to data privacy law standards.
A company must also think of a way to monetize their service in order to
cover these costs. 124 Moreover, “competitors include multi-billion dollar
corporations, who already dominate the market, enjoy the benefit of
network effects, have accumulated brand equity and trade secrets, and
have the power to acquire smaller companies.”125 This leads to an overwhelming dynamic where “the largest sets of valuable data—such as social data” (Facebook, WhatsApp), and search (Google)—are concentrated
and thereby controlled by a handful of “winners,” with no regulations
within data privacy to promote and maintain market competition.126
E. Consent
Lastly, this inextricably affects the notion of consent, as “it is often
argued that strong competition enforcement could render data protection
rules more effective by facilitating genuine consumer choice.” 127 Regardless of the requirements laid out by Kenya’s data protection privacy bill,
when one combines a lack of genuine consumer choice (due to the extreme lack of market competition) with a strong desire and or need for
the service, can true consent be granted for data extraction?
Many believe that user consent to the authorization of data extraction and user consent to sell data to third parties shifts the power dynamic
to equality between large tech companies and data subjects; however, this
is simply untrue. When the users’ desire for the service exceeds the threat
of data misuse, consent will be freely given. The World Wide Web
Foundation conducted a study in three countries, Kenya, Indonesia, and
Philippines, on “Teenagers Use of Social Media and their Understanding
of Privacy Issues in Developing Countries.” 128 Teenagers are the highest
users of social media and thus at the highest risk for data misuse. 129 The
results of this study concluded that “[m]ost surveyed teenagers are aware
that social media companies collect their personal data, but are not
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knowledgeable or do not care about how these platforms use these [da130
ta].” So, the largest users of social media in three major countries, including Kenya, are aware of data collection but do not register or care
about data misuse. Thus, their consent for data extraction is given carelessly leaving the tech companies still in control of blind users.
Additionally, the requirement of consent has not shifted the power
to users, as users are often uneducated on data sharing and misuse. Even
when they are aware, users oftentimes cannot understand the policies and
thus blindly consent.
A Deloitte survey of 2,000 consumers in the U.S found that 91
[percent] of people consent to legal terms and services conditions without
reading them. For younger people, ages 18-34 the rate is even higher
with 97 [percent] agreeing to conditions before reading. The language is
too complex and long-winded for most. 131
In Africa, “(p)rivacy advocacy groups say users of the Free Basics
Service, who may be getting online for the first time, may have little or
no understanding of what information is even being collected from
them.” 132 Furthermore, the World Wide Web Foundation study found
that “[w]hile the teenagers were typically relaxed about sharing their personal information, they seemed to be unaware that, by using social media, they also share data they do not input directly, such as location data
and browsing history.” 133 When users do not understand what they are
consenting to, the concept of consent is null and void. The companies
have no one to keep them accountable, and they remain in control by
taking advantage of the ignorance of their large user base.
Even valid consent does not prevent data misuse. Large tech companies will still own personal and sensitive data after consent is given, and
they can still sell this data to third parties without any accountability
measures. Much like when Cambridge Analytica acquired millions of data and used it to manipulate presidential elections, “the company pointed
out, this wasn’t a leak or data breach of any kind—it’s simply how Facebook works.” 134 “ ’Everyone involved gave their consent,’ according to
the company’s response on the matter.”135
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F. Limits to Defined Nation-State Privacy Laws
The limits presented above are based on the current state of technology. However, as technology continues to develop rapidly, and large
tech companies invest in a variety of beta testing experiments, the limits
of the current data protection laws will only become more prominent.
Privacy laws are typically designed to “only be enforceable within de136
fined nation-state borders.” However, some speculate that large tech
137
companies are seeking to exist outside of national borders entirely. For
example, in 2013, mystery Google barges were seen on the Western and
Eastern coasts of the United States. They appeared to be floating data
centers, 138 perhaps an early attempt at sea-steading. 139 Sea-steading “is the
attempt to create non-governmental entities outside of recognized borders and gain freedom from legal control.” 140 If large tech companies
could create sea-steads, they could operate in international waters, completely unregulated, while owning the data of billions of users, dodging
data privacy laws all together. 141
CONCLUSION
Digital colonialism is just as oppressive as the early colonialism from
the nineteenth century. Large tech companies, typically owned and primarily operated by White men, are extracting data from uninformed users and controlling that data to profit via predictive analytics. Unfortunately, strong data protection laws will not prevent this domination.
While modern data protection laws may constitute a step in the right direction, further reflection is required to answer the question of how society can protect user data in an increasingly digitally-dependent society.
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